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5
Two Ways of Socializing Moral 
Responsibility
Circumstantialism versus Scafolded- Responsiveness
Jules  Holroyd
1 Introduction
his chapter is concerned with the implications of two important developments 
in the recent literature on moral responsibility: irst, there has been a sustained 
defense of the view that moral responsibility is constituted by our social prac-
tices, rather than any metaphysically deep notion antecedent to our social rela-
tions (the social thesis). Second, it has been asked whether and why we might 
want such practices (the justiication thesis). he answers to these questions then 
guide the articulation and justiication of the standards for responsible agency 
and the norms internal to the practice that govern when individuals are liable to 
the moral responses of praise or blame.
My main aim here is to evaluate two competing views of morally responsible 
agency, each of which has been developed to sit within a view of responsibil-
ity that endorses the social thesis and the justiication thesis. hese two views are 
Vargas’s circumstantialism (2013, 2015)— the view that responsible agency is a 
function of the agent and her circumstances, and so highly context sensitive— 
and McGeer’s scafolded- responsiveness view (2015; McGeer and Petit 2015), 
according to which our responsible agency is constituted by our capacity for 
responsiveness both to reasons themselves, and to the expectations of our audi-
ence (whose sensitivity may be more developed than our own). I develop and 
defend a version of the scafolded- responsiveness view. I then make some sugges-
tive remarks about how such a view might be located within a broader concep-
tion of our practices of responsibility: that such a view coheres with a picture 
of our practices in which moral responsibility is implicated in a range of moral 
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responses beyond blame or praise. Finally, I  suggest that these conclusions 
about moral responsibility and the range of moral response may be further bol-
stered by approaching these issues via what has been called an “ameliorative” 
(cf. Haslanger 2000) rather than revisionist analysis. Revisionist analyses seek 
to revise our existing concept of responsibility, and so remain anchored in our 
extant concept. Instead, an ameliorative analysis starts by asking what we want 
the concept of responsibility for and what concept will serve those purposes, 
with no assumption that the answers we give will yield an analysis that closely 
tracks our existing understanding of moral responsibility.
2 he Social hesis
If we want to know what moral responsibility is and when we are warranted in 
deploying the concept, how should we conduct our inquiry? One approach 
would be to analyze our intuitions about the concept, revealing what conditions 
have to be in place in order to be warranted in deploying the concept in our 
interactions with others. What does the world have to be like (what metaphys-
ical conditions must obtain) and what do we have to be like as agents, in order 
to stand in certain relations to our actions such that we are morally responsible 
for them?
Revisionists argue that the concept of moral responsibility must be revised 
if it is to deliver a coherent set of conditions for responsibility. his idea is 
supported by pointing to seemingly inconsistent intuitions about responsi-
bility (for example, that ultimate control is, and is not, necessary for respon-
sibility; that determinism is, and is not, necessary for responsibility). Some of 
these intuitions, then, must be forsaken, and a revised concept adopted. How 
might one go about this revisionary project? A revisionist approach considers 
(1) what work the concept of moral responsibility does for us in our social prac-
tices, (2) whether these practices are justiiable, and (3) whether a defensible 
notion of responsibility is embedded within those practices, or can be devel-
oped from our understanding of them. Revisionism about responsibility has 
been most fully developed and defended in the recent work of Manuel Vargas 
(2013, 2015). In Vargas’s revisionism, we end up with a revised concept that 
rejects incompatibilist intuitions, according to which responsibility is depend-
ent upon some metaphysically deep feature of agents and their actions (say, the 
need or possibility of ultimate control). Rather, when we look at our social prac-
tices, we ind a concept that (1) has a role in keeping track of deserved praise 
and blame. Vargas claims that (2) these practices can be justiied if the practices 
as a whole serve to cultivate a certain valuable kind of agency, namely, agency 
that is sensitive to moral considerations. And the notion of responsibility that is 
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embedded within these practices is (3) a circumstantialist view of responsible 
agency— more details of which to follow. Whilst the core of the social thesis 
is that morally responsible agency is a mater of standing in certain social rela-
tions (rather than certain metaphysical conditions obtaining), there are various 
revisionist alternatives consistent with this position. Some such alternatives may 
hold litle appeal: consider, for example, the options of nihilism— the view that 
moral responsibility is impossible for us— or eliminativism— the prescription 
that the notion of moral responsibility should be eliminated from our normative 
discourse. Each of these later options rejects some of our intuitions about moral 
responsibility. But there would be costs to endorsing either view— in particular, 
giving up the important beneits that can be gained from our practices of holding 
each other responsible (cf. Vargas 2013, 107). If an adequate justiication of the 
social practices of holding certain agents responsible can be delivered, and if the 
conception of responsibility derived from this is a defensible one, then we have 
litle reason to pursue either of these bleaker alternatives.1 However, even if we 
seek to reject these two bleak options, there may be other— still revisionist— 
alternatives to Vargas’s circumstantialism about moral responsibility, such as the 
scafolded- responsiveness view defended here.
3 he Justiication hesis
he social thesis has been defended before, both by consequentialists, and 
famously by P. F. Strawson (1962). Both views see responsibility as constituted 
by a set of social practices: but each give diferent accounts of what justiies those 
practices, and thereby of what responsibility is. On a ‘Strawsonian psycholo-
gism,’ we hold that we cannot but engage in these practices— our psychology 
is simply geared up to feeling the reactive atitudes (resentment or gratitude) 
in response to the (poor or good) quality of will we ind manifested in others’ 
actions. To be responsible is to be liable to be held responsible, on this view. 
But this justiication takes a strong view on our psychological limits, and sup-
poses implausibly that these paterns of afective response are unchangeable: a 
ixed point in human relations. Moreover, even if we accept such constraints, this 
would explain, rather than justify, our practices (cf. Vargas 2013, 160).2
However, the Strawsonian option has seemed all the more appealing when 
set alongside the competing claim, from consequentialist thinking, that what 
justiies the practice is the good outcome of praise and blame. On this view, 
praise and blame have a certain moral inluence, encouraging people to do good 
and discouraging or deterring them from bad action. You simply are morally 
responsible if you are susceptible to be inluenced in this way. You are blame-
worthy if blaming you efects good outcomes (see, e.g., Smart 1973). his sort of 
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view seems coldly manipulative, and it circumvents the agential capacities that 
we might hope to be engaged in moral communications (see Vargas [2013, 166] 
for detailed discussion of each of these views).
Both of these views endorse the social thesis, and see responsibility as essen-
tially a social rather than metaphysical fact: an agent is responsible and liable to 
blame given the constraints of our psychological dispositions to view her in that 
way, or given the eicacy of viewing her thus. But neither of these views provides 
adequate justiication to shore up these social practices.
An alternative option has recently been developed by Vargas (2013) and 
“heartily endorsed” by McGeer (2015, 2637). Vargas’s important revisionary 
move is to develop a revised moral inluence view, which points to the good 
efects of the responsibility system for fostering a certain sort of agency, namely, 
agency that is sensitive to moral considerations. his is the ‘agency cultivation 
model.’ On this view,
when we hold one another responsible, we participate in a system of 
practices, atitudes and judgments that support a special kind of self- 
governance, one whereby we recognize and suitably respond to moral 
considerations. So, roughly, moralized praise and blame are justiied by 
their efects, that is, how they develop and sustain a valuable form of 
agency. (Vargas 2013, 2; cf. McGeer 2015, 2637)
he practice as a whole— the norms regulating judgments about and expres-
sions of deserved praise or blame— can be justiied if it promotes this valuable 
sort of agency.3 Insofar as the practice has this function— supporting a certain 
kind of self- governance, cultivating and sustaining agency that is sensitive to 
moral considerations— it looks like we have good reason to regard these prac-
tices as justiied.
4 Morally Responsible Agency
If responsibility is constituted by a social practice, and that social practice can 
be justiied, we still lack an answer to our question of what responsible agency 
is: when is an individual a responsible agent? In other words, who is a partici-
pant in those practices? We should hope the account of responsible agency has 
independent plausibility— that it coheres with our intuitions, or the contours of 
the practices with which we are familiar, and that it resonates with why we care 
about responsibility. We have additional resources we can draw on in evaluating 
an account of responsible agency, as provided by the social thesis and justiica-
tion thesis. he account of responsible agency should be one that can function 
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in the social practice of holding each other responsible. Further, the notion of 
responsible agency should be such that, when deployed, it coheres with and 
even promotes the overall aims of the practice, namely, the cultivation of morally 
sensitive agency (cf. Vargas 2013, 220). We already have a head start in this task, 
since Vargas and McGeer both endorse this revisionist approach, and have each 
developed accounts of morally responsible agency, located within this frame-
work. However, they each arrive at radically diferent conceptions of morally 
responsible agency. Next I articulate the competing accounts; then I go on to 
evaluate them.
4.1 Circumstantialism
Circumstantialism about moral responsibility builds in a familiar claim about the 
relevance of the agent’s reasons- responsiveness to her responsibility. his form of 
morally responsible agency is understood in terms of a (context- speciic) capac-
ity to recognize moral considerations, and to govern ourselves in light of our 
recognition of these. As with standard reasons- responsive accounts, the capacity 
involves responsiveness in suiciently many (counterfactually speciied) occa-
sions, in a suiciently systematic way. But unlike the more familiar versions of 
reasons- responsiveness views (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 2000), Vargas rejects 
atomism and monism about responsibility. hat is, he rejects the claim that the 
relevant capacity is a nonrelational property of agents (Vargas 2013, 204); and 
he rejects the claim that there is one psychological structure or mental capacity 
that is important for or constitutive of being suitably responsive to reasons.
Instead, we get a picture whereby the relevant capacities are relational: “a func-
tion of whether the agent (with the relevant features in the considered context 
of action) stands in a particular relationship to the normative practice” (Vargas 
2015, 2622); and whereby the capacities are plural:  there are “multiple agen-
tial structures of combinations of powers that constitute the control or freedom 
required for moral responsibility” (Vargas 2013, 205). here are good reasons 
for adopting this sort of relational and plural view of the relevant capacities: lit-
erature from empirical psychology has demonstrated that an individual’s ability 
to respond to reasons can be highly dependent on the particular circumstances, 
and inluenced by, for example, the primes provided by the environmental con-
text. One example that Vargas uses to illustrate “the startlingly localized and 
context- speciic potential for degrading our rational capacities” (2013, 207) is 
that of stereotype threat:  the phenomena whereby the activation of a stereo-
type provokes a stress response that can hinder an individual’s performance— 
desensitize them to reasons, we might say. In a context in which stereotype threat 
is in operation, an agent’s capacities are degraded by those circumstances and 
the stereotypes activated in them, which impair an individual’s ability to respond 
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to the reasons she otherwise would.4 Even from the armchair, Vargas suggests, 
it would appear that various diferent capacities are involved in diferent aspects 
of moral agency (2013, 208). For example, the capacities involved in seeing that 
someone is upset, or in arguing that one has a particular duty, or in recognizing 
a right, may each difer signiicantly. Perceptual, emotional, and cognitive rea-
soning capacities may each be demanded, and diferent situations may demand 
more or less from one or other of these capacities. Moreover, situational features 
may impair each capacity in variegated and unexpected ways.
What we end up with is a view whereby highly context- sensitive sets of capac-
ities are the constituents of an agent’s reasons- responsiveness. But the crucial 
question for this kind of view is what degree of reasons- responsiveness an agent 
must be capable of in order to be a responsible agent. We already know that for 
the circumstantialist this will not be an all- or- nothing judgment: for Vargas, an 
agent might be a responsible agent in one context, and not in another. What 
does it take in any one context, though? For any context, there is no anteced-
ently given answer to how sensitive to reasons an agent must be. Rather, that 
standard is given by the forward- looking aims of the practice, to cultivate the 
agent’s moral sensitivity. Accordingly, it depends on “whether the relevant spec-
iication of the capacity would best support agents in the actual world in the rec-
ognition and suitable response to moral considerations” (Vargas 2015, 2622). 
he relevant standard— the degree and kind of responsiveness— constitutive 
of responsible agency in a context is set by a standard, which is “actually co- 
optimal or beter for fostering agency that recognizes and suitably responds to 
moral considerations in the actual world, in ordinary contexts of action” (Vargas 
2013, 219).5 Vargas notes that a secondary aim in seting this standard is that it 
should serve to expand the contexts in which agents demonstrate such sensitiv-
ity (Vargas 2013, 220). So, a particular contextual feature (such as stereotype 
threat) may impair an agent’s sensitivity to reasons; but whether it does so in a 
way that undermines an individual’s responsibility is not something that can be 
answered without recourse to the forward- looking aims of the practice. Would 
a system of norms that supports holding the agent responsible in such contexts, 
given such sensitivities, beter serve the aims of cultivating sensitive agency?6 
his delivers the answer to whether an agent, in a context, is responsible. We will 
consider an example of how responsibility is determined in more detail shortly.
here are two crucial points to emphasize about this circumstantialist 
view: irst, the circumstantialist claim is one about morally responsible agency, 
rather than liability to blame. his means that our responsible agency is more 
“patchy” on this view than on others. For example, if an environment blocks our 
sensitivity in some way, it is not simply that we are responsible agents who are 
excused: rather, our responsible agency itself is absent. One implication of this 
is that much atention is needed to the “moral ecology” in which we function as 
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moral agents (Vargas 2013, 243– 249; see also 2017) and the environmental and 
social relations that might best cultivate such sensitivity. Secondly, it is impor-
tant to note that Vargas is keen to avoid speciications of the relevant standards 
for sensitivity in a way that would render almost no one responsible. For exam-
ple, we shouldn’t require sensitivity across almost all possible similar contexts, 
articulated in ine- grained terms, as almost no one would meet that standard, 
and “we would be required to forgo the real beneits of responsibility” (Vargas 
2013, 219). his wish to avoid general skepticism is motivated in part by Vargas’s 
principle of conservatism (that we should not too radically revise our concep-
tion) and by the idea that we should seek to preserve the beneits atendant on 
the practices of responsibility.
4.2 Scafolded- Responsiveness
Let us now contrast this circumstantialist view with what I  am calling the 
scafolded- responsiveness view of morally responsible agency, developed by 
McGeer (2015), and McGeer and Petit (2015) across a series of papers. As 
mentioned above, both McGeer and Vargas articulate their respective accounts 
of responsible agency within a view that sees responsibility as constituted by 
social practices, and that maintains that these practices are justiied by a forward- 
looking aim of fostering morally sensitive agency. However, the conceptions 
of responsibility yielded are in many respects radically divergent. Like Vargas, 
McGeer (2015) endorses a broadly reasons- responsive view of responsible 
agency, whereby an agent must have the capacity to register and respond to cer-
tain reasons to qualify as a responsible agent. However, whilst both Vargas and 
McGeer reject atomism, they do so in diferent ways. As set out above, Vargas 
construes the capacities as standing in relation to a normative practice in a con-
text. Meanwhile, on the scafolded- responsiveness view of reasons- responsiveness, 
this capacity is not simply a mater of being able directly, here and now, to reg-
ister and act on certain reasons— McGeer and Petit (2015) draw atention to 
another way in which we might be responsive to reasons: namely, indirectly. On 
this view, one is reasons- responsive also if one is able to adjust or sensitize to 
the reasons that there may be. Just as an immune system has the capacity both 
to defend against diseases it is already sensitized to, it can also become reactive 
to new diseases. Similarly, we may already be sensitive to some reasons, but also 
we may have the capacity to become sensitized to new reasons (McGeer and 
Petit 2015, 163). In particular, this capacity to become sensitized operates via 
our sensitivity to our “audience”— those whose (anticipated) judgments about 
our conduct mater to us (168). Accordingly, “as a reason- responsive agent you 
can be expected, not only to be moved by the reasons you confront in making a 
choice, but also by the audience, actual or prospective, that you confront” (170). 
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he audience should provide an environment in which “we are continually 
exhorted by one another to exercise that capacity; to think about our actions; 
to justify them to one another; to work on our weaknesses  .  .  . to nurture our 
strengths” (McGeer 2015, 2647). he expectation of one’s audience provides 
a “situational force”— one that we may care about both in itself and instrumen-
tally. Accordingly, the responsibility- relevant capacities are relational in that 
their scope is dependent on one’s audience, and this may expand the range of 
reasons to which an individual is sensitized: both those she is able to detect, and 
those she is sensitized to via her (actual or prospective) audience.7 In this way, 
others “scafold” our responsiveness to reasons, expanding the range of reasons 
to which we may be properly said to be responsive.
Note that this articulation of audience involves a certain optimism: for some, 
the audience may not in fact provide this sort of scafolding. hus, one under-
speciied aspect of the account is the interpretation of one’s prospective audi-
ence: does this include only the audience one realistically expects to face? If so, 
there may be cases in which one’s actual audience is uncritical and unsupport-
ive. On this interpretation, an uncritical audience closes of opportunities for 
enhancing sensitivity. Alternatively, the conception of ‘prospective audience’ 
may extend to audiences one can conceive of, and who populate the moral com-
munity, but whom in fact one is unlikely to face in one’s actual experience.8 For 
example, under one idealization, one’s audience will include the sorts of sub-
groups with new moral insights, who problematize unconsidered moral issues 
and “force atentiveness in agents who are already, for the most part, morally 
relective and sensitive” (Isaacs 1997, 681). On this interpretation, even if one’s 
sensitivity is restricted by one’s actual audience, it is enhanced if one could be 
sensitized to the reasons pointed to by this possible prospective audience.
On either way of developing the view, the scafolded- responsiveness picture 
rejects atomism and articulates a relational standard for the sensitivity required 
for responsible agency. Note the contrast with circumstantialism, which indexes 
the scope of the agent’s capacities to include her circumstances. his has the efect 
of limiting the scope of an agent’s responsibility: where circumstances impair or 
degrade an agent’s capacities, she may not be responsible in that context. In con-
trast, on the scafolded view, making the constituent sensitivity relational to oth-
ers’ sensitivity has the function of potentially expanding her capacities and the 
range of considerations to which an agent might be— directly or indirectly— 
sensitive. Crucially, even if an agent’s capacities are not in fact expanded, the 
insight that to be a responsible agent is to have the potential to be scafolded by 
our (actual or prospective, realistic or idealized) audience captures an important 
relational dimension of responsible agency.9 his, it is argued, coheres with the 
forward- looking aims of the practice, since engaging with individuals as respon-
sible agents— engaging in moral response such as expressions of blame— can 
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serve to bolster or reinforce those capacities, exhorting the agent to exercise 
it and aim for greater (direct) atentiveness to reasons. As McGeer and Petit 
(2015) put it, addressing each other as morally responsible agents can expand 
the scope of reasons to which we are responsive: we can capacitate each other.10
We have, then, two considerably diferent pictures of responsible agency that 
we may plug into our framework for understanding morally responsible agency 
as grounded in social practice. Is one or the other of these views more defensi-
ble? In the next section, I outline some considerations that speak in favor of the 
scafolded- responsiveness view.
5 How Should We hink about Responsible 
Agency?
How might we decide which account of responsible agency to endorse?11 First, 
we can consider which notion might best serve the justiicatory aim of the prac-
tice. Second, we can consider which notion has independent plausibility. hird, 
we can look to our existing practices and ask how they might inform our think-
ing about which notion of responsibility we should endorse. To this end, we 
can start our evaluation with some examples of cases that have already gener-
ated much critical relection; this helps us to see both how circumstantialism and 
scafolded- responsiveness would deal with these cases, and the extent to which the 
considerations articulated above are met.
Instructive cases to focus on are the cases that fall under what Vargas describes 
as “new, unusual and particularly challenging” (2013, 183) contexts of action, 
since the two accounts (as we shall see) deal radically diferently with such cases. 
Furthermore, we have a wealth of critical relection on just such cases, since 
they have been the focus of much philosophical atention. hese sorts of cases 
include those in which a moral issue is not conceived as such, so as to make di -
cult or inaccessible the moral insight required for sensitivity to the moral reasons 
at issue. One such case, discussed by Cheshire Calhoun (1989), concerns the 
use of gendered pronouns in a way that perpetuates sexist assumptions, and the 
di culty of recognizing this in a cultural context in which language use of this 
sort is not widely considered a “moral issue”:12
C1: Bert, a male philosopher writing in the second half of the twentieth 
century, always uses the male pronoun “he” to refer to supposedly uni-
versal individuals, whilst writing his philosophical papers. He does so 
in a cultural context in which this is the norm, and in which the idea that 
the use of gendered language, in this way, is problematic is extremely 
marginal— maintained only by a few themselves marginalized feminist 
AQ: In note 
10: “I ofer an 
alternative way 
of thinking about 
moral response, 
in section 5.6.” 
Please clarify 
if the cross 
reference to 
section should 
be section 6 
rather than 5.6. 
(p. 14)
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thinkers. It is certainly not a moral viewpoint with which Bert is famil-
iar, and indeed he has not even considered this aspect of his language 
use as a “moral issue.”
Another sort of case, recently much discussed, can also be thought of as a 
special case of moral ignorance: namely, cases of discriminatory behavior that 
results from implicit bias. In these cases, we can suppose, our concern is that 
agents are largely ignorant of the reasons that they have to avoid implicitly 
biased, discriminatory behavior: namely, the fact that they likely harbor implicit 
associations, which inluence their judgments and behaviors.
C2: Alfred is evaluating the CVs of predominantly white male and 
female philosophy graduates, with a view to drawing up a shortlist of 
candidates for a job. Alfred harbors implicit biases that inluence his 
judgments of the CVs of female graduates, and those graduates who are 
not racialized white: although showing qualities comparable with those 
on the CVs of the white male graduates, he sees the later as “shining” 
with a quality that the other CVs don’t seem to have. He draws up an 
all- white, all- male shortlist for the job. Alfred is not aware of the role of 
implicit bias in his judgment, nor indeed of facts about the risk of bias, 
and is conident that he has picked “the best” candidates.
As with the case of sexist language, for many people— Alfred included— it may 
not even register that there is a “moral issue” to which they are being insensitive. 
Yet the individual fails to be appropriately responsive to reasons that there are— 
to adopt procedures that may insulate decisions from bias, for example— and 
thus the question of their responsibility for this failure is activated. he general 
question of the blameworthiness of individuals in cases of moral ignorance— 
and indeed, in cases of implicit bias— is one that has been widely addressed, 
so I do not consider that here.13 Rather, what I want to ask is what determina-
tions are made on either the circumstantialist or scafolded- responsiveness view 
of responsible agency. his helps us to build a plausibility argument for one or 
other of the accounts.
5.1 Circumstantialism about Moral Ignorance
On the circumstantialist approach, whether individuals such as Bert or Alfred 
are morally responsible will depend upon whether they stand in the right rela-
tion to the normative practice. hat is, it depends on whether the agent is sui-
ciently sensitive; but our determinations of what “suicient sensitivity” involves 
look to the degree of sensitivity requisite according to the forward- looking aims 
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of the practice. In other words, the degree of sensitivity that an agent must have 
is speciied according to whether holding agents responsible, in such contexts, 
serves to improve sensitivity to the relevant moral considerations— in these 
cases, the moral reasons that there are to use nonexclusionary language or to 
atend to the possibility of bias. Note that this is not a question of whether any 
particular token of blame or instance of holding responsible will be efective 
in cultivating sensitivity. Rather, the question concerns whether a system that 
speciies this standard (whatever that turns out to be) of sensitivity required for 
responsibility in such contexts will have these agency- improving efects.
Of course, this is an empirical question. It is not at all clear to me from the arm-
chair what the answer to this question might be. However, Vargas’s application 
of circumstantialism to “new and unusual” cases indicates the conclusion that 
agents are not responsible agents in such cases, that the requisite sensitivity in 
that context is not yet present, such that moral response (notably, blame) for fail-
ure to conform with reasons would not cultivate greater sensitivity. In relation to 
these sorts of cases, Vargas indicates that the agent’s capacities are not supported 
by the context— the environment blocks the agent’s sensitivity (2013, 183)— 
such that we reach the conclusion that the individual is not a responsible agent. 
And, recall that on the circumstantialist account responsible agency is patchy— 
the agent is not simply excused from blame; rather, they simply lack the status of 
morally responsible agent; hence they are not a candidate for liability to blame, 
given the circumstances. his is because on the circumstantialist view it is respon-
sible agency, rather than any excusing condition, that does the work here.14 (his 
strikes me as problematic, but I hold of further evaluation until section 5.3.)
We get a clearer statement of this conclusion when Vargas takes circumstan-
tialism in application speciically to the case of implicit bias (see Vargas, 2017). 
here may be some reasons to think that holding responsible may have good, 
sensitizing, efects: it may provide helpful moral feedback and promulgate nar-
ratives of self- governance that help agents to live up to them (25). However, all 
things considered, Vargas argues that the present context is not one in which 
agents are responsible for implicitly biased actions: blaming may provoke hostil-
ity and may prevent individuals from “buying in” to norms that prohibit implicit 
bias (26). Further, too few individuals are equipped with the relevant knowl-
edge about the phenomenon of bias, or the possibility of mitigating it, to sup-
pose that our current context is suiciently supportive of sensitive agency. As 
such, Vargas suggests that the forward- looking aims of the practice are not met 
by holding people responsible: we do not yet have the moral ecology that sup-
ports such determinations (but may yet, in the not too distant future) (31).15 So, 
in “new, unusual or particularly challenging contexts” (2013, 183) such as the 
ones I have described, circumstantialism delivers the verdict that the individuals 
do not meet the standards for responsible agency.
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5.2 Scafolded- Responsiveness about Moral Ignorance
Before we evaluate the circumstantialist response, let us consider what the alter-
native view of responsible agency delivers in relation to this case. he scafolded- 
responsiveness view is again concerned with whether the agent has the requisite 
capacities to register and respond to the reasons to avoid (in this example) gen-
dered language. On this view, the capacity for sensitivity includes not only an 
individual’s capacities here and now to register the moral reasons in play, but 
also an agent’s capacities given the ability to adjust or sensitize to the reasons 
there are via sensitivity to an “audience.” An individual meets these conditions 
for responsible agency— meets the standard of sensitivity— either if she is pres-
ently suiciently sensitive to the reasons, or if her present capacities are such 
that she can be further capacitated by the prospective moral address of others— 
address thus furthers the forward- looking aims of the practice of improving sen-
sitive agency. Recall that much depends on how audience is speciied within the 
scafolded- responsiveness view. If one is scafolded by one’s actual audience, then 
in instances in which one’s audience is uncritical and provides no new consider-
ations or challenges, one’s sensitivity will not be enhanced by its presence. But, 
as we saw, an interpretation of the view that incorporates some idealization— 
that one’s prospective audience does include those with moral insight or who 
present moral challenges— will provide greater opportunity for capacitation.
One example of the sort of capacitating interaction at issue may be the sorts 
of address discussed by feminist philosophers’ engagement with such cases. 
(McGeer and Petit [2015] do not suggest this; I am hereby elaborating their 
account in what I  take to be defensible ways.) In dealing with cases of moral 
ignorance, a range of responses have been considered: Miranda Fricker (2010) 
delineates the notion of moral disappointment to articulate the contours of the 
appropriate moral response where we might have hoped for greater moral insight, 
even whilst cultural norms make that insight hard to achieve.16 Michelle Moody- 
Adams suggests there is scope for a kind of “forgiving moralizing” (1994, 303) in 
cases of moral ignorance, whereby we continue to maintain that an individual’s 
moral agency has been implicated in a wrong, but also recognize the great efort 
needed to adopt an appropriately critical stance toward heretofore unquestioned 
aspects of the cultural context. Cheshire Calhoun has argued for the importance 
of reproach in such cases, in order to convey the obligation to change behavior 
(e.g., avoid sexist language), to motivate individuals to relect and do beter, and 
to reinforce a view of each other as agents capable of registering and reacting to 
the relevant reasons (i.e., to be “self- legislating,” as Calhoun puts it [1989, 404]).
I do not here want to take a stance on which of these responses is the appro-
priate one in particular: the important point is that all of these authors focus on 
these kinds of moral responses to individuals as appropriate despite the agent’s 
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failure of direct responsiveness to the moral reasons. hinking about cases of 
moral ignorance helpfully provides substance, I think, to the claim from McGeer 
and Petit (2015) that our sensitivity is a function not just of our present respon-
siveness to reasons, but also of our sensitivity to audiences and their exhorta-
tions to adjust and expand the range of our direct atentiveness to reasons. Let us 
briely note— this is a point to which we later return (in section 6 below)— that 
none of these authors focus on blame or blameworthiness per se as the appro-
priate reaction to the moral agents involved. he main point to tease out for 
now is that these forms of moral address are construed as appropriately directed 
toward the agent’s failure of sensitivity. Moreover, the responses are construed 
as capacitating and enabling the agent to adjust so as to be directly sensitized to 
the considerations at issue. hus, the scafolded- responsiveness view yields the 
determination that agents in the sorts of moral ignorance cases I have described 
may yet be responsible agents. What maters is that they have the capacity to 
be sensitive to reasons indirectly, via a (perhaps idealized) prospective or actual 
audience (as well as the capacity to be directly sensitive to certain reasons 
themselves).
5.3 Which View?
he two views under consideration appear to yield substantially diferent con-
clusions about how to deal with cases of moral ignorance. Is one approach more 
defensible? In this section, I use three parameters in order to evaluate the com-
peting views. First, I consider whether either view beter serves the aim of the 
practice (of cultivating moral- considerations- sensitive agency). Second, I  ask 
whether each view has independent plausibility. hird, I  consider the extent 
to which each view coheres with our extant practices of holding each other 
responsible.
The Aims of the Practice
Each view of responsible agency is positioned within the social thesis and the 
justiication thesis, whereby responsible agency arises out of our social prac-
tices, which have the purpose of cultivating reasons- sensitive agency. Each view 
positions itself as able to serve that aim. Yet the views, as I understand them 
in relation to our cases of moral ignorance, deliver radically diferent pictures 
of responsible agency and its implications in these cases. Do we have reason to 
believe that one or other of these views would beter serve the aim of cultivating 
reasons- sensitive agency?
One of the key insights from the feminist literature on moral ignorance is 
that moral responses to failures of sensitivity are important for moral change. 
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As Calhoun puts it, “[A] n excusing response to moral ignorance precludes the 
social growth of moral knowledge” (1989, 406). And whilst Vargas raises wor-
ries about holding individuals responsible in such new and unusual cases— that 
this may provoke hostility or backlash (2017, 25)— some empirical stud-
ies suggest otherwise. In the case of implicit bias, moral confrontations have 
been found to reduce the later expression of bias (Czopp, Monteith, and Mark 
2006). And, in a study speciically on the efects of blaming responses, whilst 
blame did not reduce implicit bias signiicantly more than neutral social inter-
actions, nor did it increase bias; and, most signiicantly, blamed individuals 
more strongly expressed intentions to change future behaviors to avoid bias 
(Scaife et al., ms.). So, holding each other responsible may well increase sensi-
tivity to moral reasons. Moreover, there is the danger, to which Vargas is alert, 
of promulgating hopelessness or complacency via narratives of lack of control. 
Indeed, in one empirical study, when people were told about the pervasive 
nature of implicit bias, in the absence of a strong moral norm against this pat-
tern also being communicated, more implicit bias was subsequently displayed 
(Duiguid and homas- Hunt 2015). he circumstantialist view exempts indi-
viduals from moral responsibility if contexts do not support sensitivity to the 
relevant reasons. But in fact, this recent evidence supports Calhoun’s conten-
tion that in cases of culturally supported moral ignorance, morally engaging 
individuals may beter cultivate moral sensitivity, and so foster the aims of the 
practice.
Independent Plausibility
Even whilst ofering a revisionary account of moral responsibility, we should still 
hope that the account ofered remains recognizably a concept of moral responsi-
bility, one that resonates with the notion— or notions— we deploy in our social 
practice. It is worth noting that much of the philosophical discussion of moral 
ignorance has focused on what kind of moral response toward the morally respon-
sible agent is appropriate, rather than on the question of whether the individual 
is a responsible agent to whom moral responses are appropriate. he defeasible 
assumption here, then, is that the agents are morally responsible, such that some 
form of moral response is appropriate; the issue is what mode of response is 
most efective in increasing sensitivity to the norms at issue. he warrant for such 
moral responses depends upon holding the individual responsible for her failure 
of sensitivity. hese practices provide support for a view that yields the verdict 
that individuals are responsible for such failures. he scafolded- responsiveness 
view generates this verdict.
One might deny that our practices provide support for the scafolded- 
responsiveness view, by suggesting that all the observations I have made show 
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is that the agent must be in general sensitive to such considerations, such that 
there is a point in engaging her in moral response. he cases I have described do 
not show that the individual was sensitive to the relevant considerations at the 
time at which they behaved problematically— and so do not support the idea that 
the agent was at that time morally responsible. here are two responses to this 
worry. First, the moral responses I outlined above are not properly understood 
as directed at the agent in recognition of her general sensitivity to moral reasons. 
hey are responses of disappointment, forgiveness, or reproach directed toward 
the agent for their failure to behave as they were expected to. hey are ways of 
holding the individual responsible for that failure. hese responses are quite dif-
ferent from that of merely pointing out reasons in the hope that the individual 
will notice them in future. But this later response seems to be the only one avail-
able to the circumstantialist, who, as we have seen, is commited to holding that 
individuals in such cases are not responsible agents.
he second response returns to the adjudication that the circumstantialist 
should make. If it turns out that holding agents morally responsible in such cases 
does in fact foster morally sensitive agency— as I  suggested above— then the 
circumstantialist should seek an account that also delivers the verdict that the 
agent targeted by these responses is morally responsible. But the circumstantial-
ist view developed by Vargas does not seem to present us with those resources, 
since emphasis is placed not on the capacitating relational aspects of responsi-
bility, but on the ways circumstances may impair or erode our capacities. hese 
considerations suggest that it is the scafolded- responsiveness view that has 
greater independent plausibility.
Coherence with Practice
here is another dimension of our practices that an independently plausi-
ble account of moral responsibility should seek to respect. his feature— and 
indeed, one of the points of grounding an account of moral responsibility within 
such social practices— is that, for the most part, we do interact with each other 
on the assumption that we are morally responsible agents. In the Strawsonian 
phrase, we occupy “the participant standpoint” (Strawson 1962) in our dealings 
with each other much of the time. Accordingly, an account that is independ-
ently plausible would avoid the determination of widespread skepticism about 
responsible agency— that is, it would avoid the implication that we lack respon-
sible agency much of the time. Indeed, part of the revisionist project is to save 
the notion of responsibility from the skepticism ot generated by incompatibil-
ism. his is due to the recognition that responsible agency is valuable, and being 
able to interact with each other as such is an important— and beneicial— part of 
human life. Hence Vargas’s aspiration that we should avoid seting the standards 
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for responsibility such that almost no one is responsible, as we miss out on the 
beneits of these social practices.
But the circumstantialist view is in fact ill placed to avoid such skepticism and 
shore up such value. On the one hand, for all we know, we may frequently be 
in situations of moral ignorance. For much of the time, there may be reasons to 
which we are not (yet) sensitized. On the other hand, for all we know, there may 
be many ways in which situational and contextual factors impinge on our agency. 
If such moral ignorance or situational inluences are— as the circumstantialist 
view prescribes— precisely the sorts of impairments that render us (not excused, 
but) not responsible agents, then for all we know, we lack moral responsibility in 
relation to some or other moral consideration much of the time. McGeer also 
presses this challenge when she argues that, for Vargas, “the fact that [an agent] 
is pro tanto blameworthy for failing to respond to [moral] considerations M in 
[context] C does not mean that she is blameworthy tout court” (2015, 2645). 
his is because there may be a range of other considerations in play in C to which 
the agent is not sensitive. Accordingly, “circumstantialism actually raises the bar 
for (tout court) blameworthiness” (2015, 2645). But the point holds not just 
with respect to blameworthiness, but also with respect to responsible agency 
itself. For the range of considerations in relation to which sensitivity is lacking, 
the agent may not be a responsible agent if the moral ecology is not yet in place. 
his is a direct function of having the concept of moral responsibility do the 
work of exempting agents from responsibility in such circumstances, rather than 
the notion of excuse, which upholds the agent’s status as morally responsible 
whilst mitigating blame (see Vargas 2013, 183). his means, as Vargas acknowl-
edges, this account of responsibility is “more targeted” than those views that 
endorse a generalized capacity for responding to reasons (Vargas 2013, 228). 
As a result, this targeted approach leaves circumstantialism open to skepticism, 
insofar as it is eminently likely that there are almost always some moral consid-
erations in a context to which we lack sensitivity. Accordingly, it may never by 
the case that we are responsible agents tout court. his is to countenance a form 
of skepticism about morally responsible agency that does not cohere with the 
plausible assumption that we can adopt the “participant standpoint” in our daily 
interactions; that we can engage with each other as responsible agents— albeit 
imperfect, oten defective responsible agents, with much to learn— much of the 
time. he scafolded- responsiveness view— which identiies the ways in which 
our sensitivity may be incomplete but open to adjustment via sensitivity to oth-
ers’ viewpoints— seems beter placed to capture this aspect of our responsibility 
practice.
Of course, a proponent of circumstantialism may respond that she too can 
capture this feature of our practice: any speciication of the standards of respon-
sibility that generated such skepticism about responsible agency would indeed 
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be at odds with the aims of the practice, so the speciication should be adjusted 
so as to permit the judgment that we are responsible agents on more occasions 
than the skeptical determinations supply. However, once that move is made, it 
is not clear what remains circumstantial about the circumstantialist view. Seting 
the standard for responsibility in a way that insulates responsibility from perva-
sive threats from situational context or culturally pervasive ignorance removes 
the supposed sensitivity to the circumstances of responsibility. I think this is a 
good move, but it is not one that renders responsible agency circumstantial.
he considerations raised in this section suggest that the circumstantialist 
view does not cohere with valuable aspects of our practice, and they also reveal 
tensions within the competing aims of the account: to capture the context sensi-
tivity of our capacities, whilst also seting the standard for the relevant capacities 
guided by the forward- looking aim of the practice. he circumstantialist restricts 
the scope of responsible agency, and must maintain that there is some discon-
tinuity in the kind of agency implicated in cases of moral ignorance and that 
displayed in cases where the agent is in fact (according to the circumstantialist) 
morally responsible. Meanwhile, the scafolded- responsiveness view is beter 
placed in terms of the independent plausibility of a notion that delivers deter-
minations of responsibility that are consistent with the value of adopting the 
participant standpoint in our everyday interactions.
Moreover, whilst the scafolded- responsiveness view is a somewhat revision-
ary characterization of reasons- responsiveness as understood within the phil-
osophical literature, the view in fact beter coheres with the social practices we 
engage in (cf. McGeer and Petit 2015, 174). I take it that the examples from the 
literature on moral ignorance bear out this claim. Insofar as some sort of moral 
response is engaged (reproach,17 forgiveness, moral challenge, disappointment), 
this is because the agent has the capacities, in the scafolded sense, to be sensi-
tive to these considerations. his consideration, then, provides further support 
for the scafolded- responsiveness view, rather than the circumstantialist account 
of responsible agency.
However, one crucial point on which we should remark is that our atention 
to these social practices engages a host of moral responses that are not coex-
tensive with blame. How can we maintain that responsible agency is engaged 
in such cases, if the moral responses involved are not blame? Ater all, isn’t lia-
bility to blame simply what it is to be a responsible agent, such that if we are 
not concerned here with blame, we cannot then be concerned with responsible 
agency? Both proponents of circumstantialism (Vargas 2013) and scafolded- 
responsiveness (McGeer 2015; McGeer and Petit 2015) seem to endorse what 
we can refer to as the liability assumption:  that to be a responsible agent is to 
be liable to praise or blameworthiness. We see this in the claim that what it is 
“to blame someone [is] to hold them responsible in a negative sense” (McGeer 
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and Petit 2015, 161). Similarly, Vargas proceeds on the assumption that being 
morally responsible is simply a mater of the agent having the relevant capacities 
and deploying them in an action that is praiseworthy or blameworthy (2013, 
213). Later, it is explicitly held that “we should reserve the phrase ‘is morally 
responsible’ for cases in which moral praise and blame can arise” (309). If this is 
how we are thinking about moral responsibility— as tightly bound with praise 
or blameworthiness— then the fact that we ind moral responses such as disap-
pointment, moralizing forgiveness, reproach, and moral confrontation in cases 
of moral ignorance, does nothing to support the claim that there is morally 
responsible agency present. If this is right, then no support is garnered by the 
scafolded- responsiveness view, and the circumstantialist seems beter placed to 
capture this absence of responsible agency. However, in the next section, I point 
toward strong reasons for rejecting the characterization of moral responsibility 
as liability to praise or blame.
6 Beyond Blame
he story so far: I have presented some examples of culturally pervasive moral 
ignorance— about language use, about implicit bias— and considered how cir-
cumstantialism and scafolded- responsiveness views of moral responsibility 
deal with them. We have arrived at the following possible positions regarding 
the responsibility of the agents involved:
 1. We could maintain that agents in these cases are not responsible (circumstan-
tialism), so not blameworthy (I raised various concerns about this approach);
 2. We could maintain that agents in these cases are responsible (scafolded- 
responsiveness) and so are blameworthy (given the liability assumption);
 3. We could maintain that agents are responsible (scafolded- responsiveness) 
but may not be blameworthy (reject the liability assumption).
Given the considerations we have aired so far, I have suggested there are rea-
sons to construe moral responsibility on the model of scafolded- responsiveness, 
such that agents in moral ignorance may be morally responsible. I suggest this 
move is strengthened if we reject the liability assumption. Whilst a full defense 
of this claim is beyond the scope of this chapter, I  suggest that such a move 
coheres with a view of responsibility grounded in our social practices.
In articulating the regulatory norms of the practice, Vargas focuses on the 
norms governing praise and blame:  indeed, the concept of responsibility 
itself is set up as serving the purpose of keeping track of deserved praise and 
blame (2013, 250). Importing a broadly Strawsonian picture within the social 
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practices, the regulatory norms hold that blame is deserved if a suitably sensitive 
agent demonstrates a deicit of good will; and praise is deserved when good will 
is manifested (see Vargas 2013, 250). But is this really an adequate characteri-
zation of the use to which we put the notion of moral responsibility? Certainly 
it is part of the use of the concept. his is a particularly important aspect of the 
concept from the point of view of metaphysical conceptions of moral responsi-
bility: we must be the kind of agents— ultimately in control, free from determin-
inistic forces— who deserve either punitive blame or the rewards of praise (cf. 
Strawson 1994).
But once we endorse the social thesis and focus on our social practices, the 
exclusive atention on praise and blame is unwarranted. Rather, my proposal 
is that whilst deserved praise and blameworthiness are among the regula-
tory norms of this practice, there is also a range of other moral judgments and 
responses that do important regulatory work— those implicated where moral 
failures warrant responses other than blame, for example. hese are illustrated 
by our cases of moral ignorance above. Indeed, it is notable that when P. F. 
Strawson irst introduced the reactive atitudes as constitutive of the social prac-
tice of holding responsible, his focus was not limited to praise and blame, but 
extended to a range of atitudes including resentment, gratitude, indignation, 
pride, and love. At least, then, it looks like a mistake to preclude, via conceptual 
iat, the importance of other kinds of moral response to moral failures. Further, 
there are good reasons to suppose that these kinds of moral response may be at 
least as well placed as praise or blame to serve the purpose of cultivating sensi-
tive agency. We should hope for a characterization of responsible agency and 
moral response that respects these broader possibilities.
How should we make room for these other kinds of moral response? One 
option would be to see moral responses such as disappointment, reproach, indig-
nation, and so on simply as part of, or subsumed within, a model of blame and the 
regulatory norms governing its atribution and expression. With this move, the 
various moral responses are already captured by the liability assumption: that an 
agent is responsible when she is liable to blame (or praise) broadly construed. 
But this is obfuscatory on two counts. First, characterizations of blame are oten 
importantly distinct from these other moral responses; supposing that all of 
them are a species of blame obscures important diferences between them. For 
example, blame may aim to make an individual feel guilty; indignation may not. 
Blame may aim to cause sufering; disappointment may not (cf. Bennet 2002). 
Second, this move obfuscates the notion of liability, since there may be diferent 
conditions of warrant for these diferent kinds of moral response. For example, 
the warrant for blame may require that the agent meets epistemic conditions 
(she should have known the language was exclusionary); the warrant for disap-
pointment may not (cf. Fricker 2010).
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Another option, then, is to see these other modes of moral response as 
distinct from blame, and illing out our conception of the kinds of moral 
responses with which we engage each other as morally responsible agents. 
hese other modes of moral response sit alongside blame as ways of holding 
each other to account (on tokened occasions) and improving our sensitiv-
ity to moral considerations (via our engagement in the practice). here are 
independent reasons for making this move: relection on our practices does 
indeed reveal a broader range of moral communication than is captured by 
simply blame and praise. Some philosophical literature has addressed these 
modes of moral response, analyzing the structure and role of responses such 
as indignation, anger, contempt, and disappointment (e.g., Srinivasan 2017; 
Mason 2003; Fricker 2010; Westlund,  chapter  10, this volume). Yet these 
responses and analyses are ignored by a conception of responsibility that 
treats responsible agency as constituted by liability to blame (or praise), nar-
rowly construed.
Such a broadening of our moral responses is particularly appealing in com-
bination with a scafolded- responsiveness view of responsible agency. his view 
permits that agents may be morally responsible for failures of responsiveness in 
virtue of their capacity to be sensitized. Where sensitivity is indirect (via pro-
spective audience), liability to a wider range of moral responses than blame may 
be particularly apt. here is clearly much more to be said here in articulating a 
fuller picture of these modes of moral response and the conditions for their war-
rant. My main aim in this section has been to motivate a framework that makes 
room for such work.
7 Beyond Revisionism about Responsibility
I have been engaged with the following set of theses about our practices of hold-
ing each other morally responsible:
–  he social thesis
–  he justiication thesis
–  Scafolded- responsiveness about responsible agency
–  A rejection of the liability assumption and an expanded repertoire of moral 
response.
his set of theses together stand in need of further defense. I want to close by 
ofering some suggestive remarks about the methodological approach we might 
take whilst developing these theses. My proposal is that they can beter be 
defended if we frame the task of doing so as an explicitly ameliorative analysis 
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of responsibility, rather than as merely a revisionary project. What distinguishes 
these two approaches, and why does it mater which we adopt?
Revisionism, as we have seen, starts with “our” concept of moral responsi-
bility, but acknowledges that we may have to revise some aspects of thinking 
about the concept and embrace certain new implications. But the method of 
inquiry is essentially conceptual analysis, with a commitment to rationalizing 
that concept as far as possible. We proceed by testing intuitions about the limit 
of our concept of responsibility (when someone is or is not responsible, and 
why), and try to get an analysis that best matches it whilst being both consist-
ent and capable of doing the justiicatory work needed. But such a project is 
essentially bound by a “principle of conservation,” whereby “even though we 
are entertaining a revisionist proposal, there is still reason to limit the scope of 
revisions” (Vargas 2013, 103), so as not to depart too far from “our” concept. 
Such an analysis is therefore beholden to what Kelly McCormick (2013) calls 
the reference- anchoring problem: the problem of showing that the revised con-
cept of responsibility yielded remains suiciently close to the folk psycholog-
ical concept, in order to avoid the charge of changing the subject. Moreover, 
revisionists face what McCormick calls the normativity- anchoring problem, 
which challenges the revisionist to explain why we should care about the new 
concept. Revisionists are skeptical about the force of folk intuitions per se, jeti-
soning some (incompatibilist ones) in formulating a revisionary account. hen, 
when we ask the justiicatory question of why we should care about the revised 
concept— in this case, of responsibility- related practices— we ind an appeal to 
the value of a certain form of agency. But the revisionist cannot appeal to intu-
ition in support of this value, for, as we have seen, the revisionist is skeptical 
about folk intuition. So either revisionists must explain why some intuitions 
count for more than others, or— absent further argument— we lack adequate 
justiicatory grounds for the revised concept.
I want to propose that an ameliorative analysis of responsibility is pref-
erable and in particular is on a beter footing in relation to these problems.18 
Ameliorative analyses do not try to unpack and articulate our concept. Instead, 
this sort of inquiry is normatively motivated: we start by asking what the legit-
imate purposes are for which we want and use the concept, and then, having 
articulated those purposes, we identify which concept we ought to use given 
those purposes. For example, an ameliorative analysis of moral responsibility 
could start by asking, do we want the concept to maximize utility? Or to track 
desert? Or to improve morally sensitive agency? Do we want the concept to be 
inclusive or elitist? Or do we want the concept at all? hese questions are fore-
grounded in an ameliorative analysis, and the concept that can serve the legit-
imate purposes is then formulated. As such, there is no need for a principle of 
conservation, since the aim is not to give an analysis of “our” concept, but to 
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set out an account of what the concept should be and should be used for. For 
example, we might identify the legitimate purpose to which we put the notion of 
moral responsibility as that of cultivating a certain kind of agency, via the means 
of moralized response.19 We then ask what concept of responsibility we ought to 
deploy for this purpose. Such an approach avoids the reference- anchoring prob-
lem, since the ameliorative approach asks what our concept ought to be, and so 
it maintains no pretense that the analysis will yield a concept close to the extant 
folk concept. It is not an atempt at conceptual analysis of “our” concept: an 
ameliorative approach is explicit that it may change the subject. To the extent 
that the ameliorative analysis has to deal with questions about how far the analy-
sis departs from our intuitive concept, this is a practical question about whether 
people could and will take up the newly formulated notion of responsibility, and 
not simply a worry about “changing the subject.”
Further, conceiving of the project as an ameliorative analysis can also address 
the normativity- anchoring problem. Such an analysis need not reject (some, or 
all) intuitions as useful in theorizing. Indeed, proponents of this analysis can 
maintain that intuition— for example, about the value of certain aspects of our 
practice— provides important data for conceptual analysis. But the ameliorative 
project is simply diferent in kind:  it atempts to ask what concept we ought to 
use for our legitimate purposes (rather than ask what our concept is). Accordingly, 
adopting this sort of analysis brings no methodological commitment to general 
skepticism about intuition, and we can rely on intuition as helpful and method-
ologically respectable in guiding our understanding of what we want the concept 
to do for us, or in explaining the values that underpin the justiication of the prac-
tice. Moreover, the ameliorative project needs to show that the concept argued 
for serves legitimate purposes, and it would have to argue for those purposes as 
legitimate. In this context, say, we would have to argue for the purpose of cultivat-
ing moral- considerations- sensitive agency as legitimate.20 Arguing that this aim is 
legitimate is in principle consistent with conceptual pluralism; we might have dif-
ferent concepts for diferent legitimate purposes, subject to feasibility constraints.21
hese considerations provide some reason for pursuing an ameliorative 
analysis, rather than a merely revisionary approach. However, there is a further 
strong reason for adopting this approach: doing so leads us to explicitly relect 
on the question of what we want our concept of responsibility for and what work 
the concept ought to be doing for us. If our practices of responsibility are social 
practices, and thus contingent on the sustaining, critiquing, and reforming of 
certain social arrangements, it is right that we should carefully scrutinize and 
ask whether those social practices can be altered or improved. hat is, once the 
social thesis is endorsed, and we move away from a view on which responsibility 
is simply a mater of certain metaphysical conditions being met, the question of 
how we want our responsibility practices to be is opened up.
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I have suggested that if we want the concept to be doing work for us in prac-
tices that aim to cultivate moral- considerations- sensitive agency, then we should 
endorse the scafolded- responsiveness account of moral responsibility. his 
view can serve those purposes by expanding the range of reasons to which we 
are (directly and indirectly) responsive at any time. his enables us to see mor-
ally responsible agency as implicated in a range of cases— such as those of moral 
ignorance— in which moral responses other than blame are engaged in order to 
further sensitize agents to the reasons in play. Some of the considerations I raised 
in defending the scafolded- responsiveness view indeed drew on features of our 
practices as we ind them. But this view may be best defended, I have suggested, 
by pursuing an ameliorative analysis. Such an account is beter suited to engage 
both the role of the social practice of holding responsible, and of responsible 
agency, in contexts in which we oten ind ourselves, namely those in which our 
moral understanding is impoverished, but— we hope— improving. And surely 
this is what we want these social practices for.22
Notes
 1. Note that revisionists face certain challenges: irst, they must show that the account remains 
an analysis of moral responsibility. hat is, they must show that the revisions made have not 
ended up changing the subject (McCormick [2013, 5] calls this the reference- anchoring 
problem). Second, they must show why the account delivered remains one we should still 
care about: since it does not capture all of our intuitions, does it still capture other important 
ones— or are there other things that can shore up the value of the practice we are let with 
(what McCormick [2013, 13] calls the normativity- anchoring problem)? Addressing these 
two concerns will be aided by facing a further challenge: namely, articulating what the prac-
tical implications are of adopting revisionism. For example, Vargas notes that if revisionism 
requires us to give up incompatibilist intuitions (intuitions that favor alternative possibilities, 
or require ultimate control, say), “there may be isolated pockets of our practice that . . . can-
not continue as before” (2015, 2623). However, Vargas does not articulate what those parts 
that we may have to jetison would be. Yet my sense is that it will be di cult to fully meet the 
irst two challenges before we have a good grasp on exactly how our responsibility practices 
themselves (rather than our concept) may change. I address these methodological issues in 
the inal section.
 2. We might worry about the fairness of Vargas’s objections to Strawsonian psychologism, cri-
tiquing the practice as a whole (our dispositions, as humans, to engage in certain kinds of 
practice) by using a case that focuses on an individual’s psychological dispositions (the exam-
ple of jealous Dave, who has certain ixed psychological dispositions to feel jealous of his 
partner’s other friendships, but comes to question the justiiability of the expression of these 
feelings [Vargas 2013, 162]). Just because individuals’ dispositions are explanatory rather 
than justiicatory, this does not mean that the set of dispositions as a feature of agents engaged 
in a practice has no justiicatory power. Sommers (2013) has also raised this concern.
 3. here are important diferences between Vargas’s model, which focuses on the efects of the 
system as a whole (i.e., a system of norms that regulate praise and blame), and McGeer’s 
model, which focuses rather on the cultivation of sensitivity in particular tokens of moral 
response (such as blame or praise).
 4. Vargas wants to resist framing this in terms of the agent’s capacities remaining the same, but 
exercising them becoming more di cult— since this just pushes the issue back a step: our 
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abilities to exercise those capacities are not cross- situationally stable, even if the capacities 
themselves are (2013, 208). I actually think that “pushing the issue” back a step maters a great 
deal, for reasons articulated in section 5— namely, it allows us to maintain the claim that the 
individual is a responsible agent, albeit an agent who did not exercise her capacity to recog-
nize reasons in that context.
 5. Vargas spells out the details of how sensitive agents must be to qualify as responsible in 
counterfactual terms, which concern the frequency (“a suitable proportion of worlds” 
[2013, 214]) with which one would respond to moral considerations in relevantly similar 
contexts. Details are needed about this frequency (what proportion of possible worlds?) and 
about the description of contexts that are relevantly similar (coarse- or ine- grained descrip-
tions of morally relevant considerations and contexts?). hese maters are setled by looking 
to what proportion of possible worlds, described at what degree of ine- or coarse- grainedness 
up for discussion, is at least as good as any other in fostering moral- considerations- sensitive 
agency (2013, 219).
 6. Of course, this is a di cult question for us to answer. Vargas relies on an ideal observer to 
determine this. It is not clear to me how this part of the picture integrates with an account 
whereby responsibility is constituted by our social practices, but I set this worry aside for 
another occasion.
 7. McGeer and Petit (2015) develop this model to explain how we should understand blame: as 
a sanction that enforces a speciic or general injunction against inatentiveness to reasons, and 
that serves as a post hoc exhortation to be atentive. I am not persuaded by this aspect of their 
account, but it is not entailed by the scafolded- responsiveness view, so we can regard these 
parts of the account as separable.
 8. A related issue concerns the remarks about one’s audience being “authorized” as a source of 
moral guidance or challenge (McGeer and Petit 2015, 172), and whether this includes those 
one in fact views as authorized, or those one should authorize qua members of the moral 
community. he issue here and in the text is ultimately how much idealization is built into the 
conception of audience in the account.
 9. I  am grateful to Marina Oshana for helping me to pinpoint this dimension of diference 
between the two accounts. For an alternative way of formulating the relational aspects of 
responsibility, see Westlund,  chapter 10, this volume.
 10. On their view, the sanctioning component of the blame serves to fulil the promised threat 
that accompanies the exhortation “atend to reasons or else” (McGeer and Petit 2015, 183– 
185). I am not persuaded by this part of their view, but it seems to me inessential to the scaf-
folded view of responsible agency. I ofer an alternative way of thinking about moral response, 
in section 5.6. Note also that this feature of McGeer and Petit’s view applies to particular 
tokens of blame, rather than the practices as a whole, which is a point at which their justiica-
tion departs from Vargas’s.
 11. Or indeed, any notion of responsible agency— there may be others that fare beter than either 
of the two available. I consider this the start of our inquiry, which may end up with a diferent 
account yet.
 12. Other prominent examples in the literature on moral ignorance include Michele Moody- 
Adams’s (1994) discussion of the alleged di culty of recognizing the wrong of slavery in cul-
tures in which slave ownership was common. Another, from Miranda Fricker’s (2010) work, 
is that of a schoolteacher whose cultural context makes it di cult to grasp the moral insight 
that corporal punishment is wrong. I focus on Calhoun’s case because it is (I assume) more 
proximal to the cultural context in which readers are located. his is not to say there are not 
many other analogous cases to which similar thoughts may apply (exploitation of cheap labor, 
climate pollution, the food industry, and so on and so on).
 13. See Isaacs 1997; Calhoun 1989; Moody- Adams 1994; Fricker 2010; Saul 2013; Holroyd 
2012; Brownstein 2016; and Washington and Kelly 2016.
 14. Vargas writes, “[I] f the threat to a responsibility ascription operates via some threat to the 
normal capacity to respond to moral considerations (as seems more likely in cases of new, 
unusual, or particularly challenging contexts of action), then the issue is how these concerns 
are accommodated internal to some account of the capacities required for being subject 
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to the responsibility norms. In other words, we look to our theory of responsible agency” 
(2013, 183).
 15. Note that it seems not at all clear that we should say similar things in the more standard case 
of moral ignorance:  that holding responsible for gendered language is inappropriate since 
it provokes hostility, prevents buy- in to the norms against gendered language, and that the 
knowledge is not in place to permit suicient sensitivity. his, for me, provides additional 
reason for doubting the circumstantialist view.
 16. hough note that Fricker is concerned with cases in which we are at a historical distance from 
the wrongdoers, such that it may no longer be possible to capacitate them.
 17. Note, however, Calhoun’s detachment of the justiication of reproach (responsibility) and its 
point (moral change).
 18. For a statement of ameliorative analyses, see Haslanger 2000. For discussion of the contours 
of such an inquiry see Burgess and Plunket, 2013a, 2013b.
 19. Compare a consequentialist ameliorative analysis, which might specify the legitimate purpose 
as maximizing utility and specify a concept of responsibility that serves this purpose: blame-
worthy if susceptible to moral inluence.
 20. Compare Haslanger’s (2000) ameliorative analysis of gender, which argues that ending gen-
der inequality is the legitimate aim.
 21. See Saul 2006; Jenkins 2016.
 22. I am grateful for extremely useful feedback from the editors of this volume, and for construc-
tive discussion with Federico Picinali, Yonatan Shemmer, Manuel Vargas, and audiences at 
Macquarie University and the University of Sheield.
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